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INTRODUCTION

Contributory negligence is a rule that bars plaintiffs from recovering in a
negligence action. Replacing contributory negligence with comparative negligence
replaces that rule with a rule that permits a negligent plaintiff to recover a portion
of her damages, right?
Yes and no. Comparative negligence does that, but like a stone thrown into a
pond, the ripple effects of comparative negligence are far broader than merely
removing the bar to recovery by a negligent plaintiff. We might think of the first
ring of effects as the abolition of doctrines developed to ameliorate the harshness
of contributory negligence, including last clear chance and stricter rules of
proximate cause for plaintiff contributory negligence. But there are several more
and larger rings ofripples that cut a wide swath across tort law. Indeed, the breadth
and depth ofthe impact of comparative negligence on tort law belies the conception
that comparative fault merely changes the rule about apportioning liability between
a negligent plaintiff and defendant.
In addition to permitting plaintiffs to maintain a negligence suit despite their
own fault, comparative negligence afforded courts the opportunity to apportion
liability in a more fine-grained manner than an all-or-nothing or pro rata basis.
Contributory negligence could have been replaced with a pro rata system for

* Bess and Walter Williams Distinguished Professor ofLaw, Wake Forest University School
of Law. My thanks to Anna Richardson for her superb research assistance.
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apportionment between plaintiffs and defendants.1 Alternatively, it could have been
replaced with a rule that placed all of the liability on the party found most at fault.2
Employing a 100-unit scale for apportioning liability meant courts no longer had
to choose from the crude array of tools for apportioning liability among the parties
to a suit, which sometimes required selecting the tool that produced the lesser of
two evils.3 Comparative contribution, a logical outgrowth of comparative
negligence, permitted as discriminating a scale for allocating damages as usefully
could be employed.4
Comparative negligence has also influenced tort claims outside the negligence
universe. Historically, defenses were specific to the individual tort claim asserted:
contributory negligence was a defense to a negligence action but not to a strict
liability or intentional tort claim. Self defense was a defense specific to intentional
torts and so on. While the full impact of comparative fault on intentional torts has
yet to be realized, a significant body of cases now permits the use of comparative
responsibility in apportioning liability among negligent and intentional tortfeasors.6
Indeed, a number of courts permit defendants who have committed intentional torts
to assert comparative responsibility by the plaintiff as a defense, at least in cases in
which the plaintiff's conduct might be thought of as unreasonably provoking the
defendant.7 That is not what most of us were taught in law school--defenses to
intentional torts include consent, self-defense, and some other particularized
defenses, but these defenses are specific to intentional torts.
In strict products liability, comparative responsibility has had an even more
dramatic effect. Negligence by the plaintiff was not a defense in a strict products
liability case in the early days of § 402A,' a rule at least in part based on the
1. Cf Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1176 (Cal. 1978) (Clark, J., concurring)
(advocating uniform percentage reduction for all negligent plaintiffs).
2. A similar rule existed in Illinois in the nineteenth century. See Galena & Chicago Union R.R1
Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill.
478, 497 (1858).
3. Comparative fault actually permits an apportionment that is even more finely-grained than
that provided by a centiscale, given the availability of decimal divisions. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part III.
5. I use this term to refer to apportionment among multiple tortfeasors as it encompasses all
forms of tortious conduct. Itis also the terminology employed in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS:
APPORTIOMENT OF LIABILITY (2000).

6. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1cmt. c, Reporters'
Note (2000). England, Canada, and New Zealand have interpreted their comparative fault statutes to
permit apportionment offault to plaintiff in an intentional tort case. See ALLENM. LINDEN, CANADIAN
TORT LAw 94-95 (6th ed. 1997); W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD &JOLOWICZ ON TORT 234 & n.65 (15th
ed. 1998); Hoebergenv. Koppens, [1974] 2N.Z.L.R. 597,603. For a provocative claim that criminal
law reflects aspects ofa comparative responsibility approach, especially when the victim has provoked
the attack, see Alon Harel, Efficiency andFairnessin CriminalLaw: The Casefora CriminalLaw
Principleof Comparative Fault,82 CALIF. L. REV.1181, 1211-26 (1994).

8. See, e.g., McCown v. Int'l Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting contributory
negligence as a defense to claims based on § 402A); 2 DAVID G. OwEN, M. STUARTMADDEN&MARY
J. DAVIS, MADDEN& OWEN ONPRODUcTSLABILITY § 14:2, at2l (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter2 MADDEN
& OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY] ("[M]ost courts quickly adopted comment n's rejection of the
defense of'simple contributory negligence as a bar to strict products liability in tort."). To be sure, the
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harshness of visiting the entire loss on but one of several persons who had engaged
in conduct proscribed by tort law. Comparative responsibility, which followed
shortly thereafter, obviated that concern and contributed to the transition to a rule
that has largely captured the products liability day-a plaintiff's negligent conduct
reduces but does not bar a strict products liability claim.9 I expect the same will be
true in future cases employing strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity in
which a plaintiff acts unreasonably.°
Beyond this unifying effect on the defenses available in a tort suit based on
physical harm, comparative responsibility has affected (and may yet affect) a
number of other tort law rules that were developed in a day when plaintiffs'
negligence barred recovery. Those rules were developed in a legal environment in
which only blameless plaintiffs could recover in a negligence action. The most
significant of these rules holds independent tortfeasors jointly and severally liable
for a plaintiff's harm." Joint and several liability has two effects: it imposes the
risk that another defendant will be insolvent on the remaining defendants, and it
leaves the burden of joining other potentially liable parties on the defendant(s). 2
The justification for imposing the risk of insolvency on defendants, however, is that
as between an innocent plaintiff and culpable defendants, itis fair that the latter bear
this risk." Thus, we should not be surprised that as comparative responsibility
became established, joint and several liability fell out of favor. Today, joint and
several liability survives in but fifteen states, including the five remaining
contributory negligence jurisdictions. 4 Although joint and several liability is the
most notable of the legal doctrines affected in this way by the advent of
comparative responsibility, it is not the only doctrine to be so affected. The rule
placing the burden of proof on defendants to apportion the harm when the extent

Restatement (Second) of Torts only provided that negligent failure to discover a defect was not a
defense and did not address the remaining range of negligent behavior by plaintiffs. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17 Cmt a, Reporters' Note (1998).
10. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
§ 25 (Tentative Draft No. 1,2001).
11. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
12. Plaintiffs often assume this burden because it is in their strategic interests.
13. Professor Richard Wright argues that joint and several liability is justified even after the
adoption ofcomparative responsibility because each defendant's culpablebehavioris the cause ofthe
entirety of plaintiff's harm. See Richard W. Wright, AllocatingLiabilityAmongMultiple Responsible
Causes: A PrincipledDefense ofJoint and SeveraILiabilityforActualHarm andRisk Exposure, 21
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1141,1209 (1988). Professor Wright helpfully makes the point that apportioning
liability based on comparative responsibility does not alter the fact that each defendant is a cause of
the entirety of the harm. Id. at 1152-53. The difficulty with his argument is that the plaintiff's
negligence is also a cause of the harm, leaving no reason to prefer the defendants over the plaintiff
to bear the risk of insolvency. Professor Wright subsequently acknowledged the fairness of
apportioning the risk of a defendant's insolvency among all of the remaining responsible parties,
including the plaintiff. See Richard W. Wright, The Logic andFairnessofJoint andSeveralLiability,
23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 45, 77-78 (1992).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENTOF LIABMiTY § 17 cmt. a, Reporters' Note
(2000).
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of harm each caused is uncertain is another example.' The burden-shifting rule of
Summers v. Tice, 6 the case involving two hunters who fired negligently but only
one of whom caused the plaintiff's harm, is another potential example of a rule that

may be affected by comparative responsibility.' 7 A tertiary ring of ripples

exists-further modifications effected by the changes described above. The law

apportioning liability for occupational injuries when an injured employee pursues
a products liability claim and the employer's (or co-employee's) negligence also
caused the injury has been a festering sore in the law since products liability became
a serious basis of liability and was applied to occupational injuries." The advent of

15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965) (stating the rule that the burden of
proof forcausal apportionment is on defendants); RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTs: APPORTIONMENT
OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. h(2000) (explaining that the advent of comparative responsibility undermines
the rationale for imposing the burden ofproof on defendants and suggesting alternative options that
accommodate the effect of comparative responsibility).
16. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
17. Alternative liability was based on the ground that as between culpable defendants and
innocent plaintiff, the defendants should bear the burden of proof on causation when plaintiff
reasonably was unable to do so. Id. at 4. Despite several decades of comparative responsibility, we
have found only two cases in which the suggestion of plaintiff negligence existed along with a claim
based on alternative liability. One such case is Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The court did not face the question of reconciling alternative liability and plaintiff negligence
because the District ofColumbia is ajurisdiction in which contributory negligence remains a complete
bar to recovery. Id. The second such case is Vahey v. Sacia, 178 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Ct. App. 1981). In
Vahey, the court reversed a judgment for defendant based on the failure of the trial court to give an
alternative liability instruction. Id. at 564. Defendant argued that the instruction was inappropriate
because the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt may have also caused or contributed to her injuries.
Id. at 562. The court's initial response was that the jury should be instructed that only if it found that
the plaintiff was not negligent would alternative liability and a concomitant shift in the burden of
proof be appropriate, which is consistent with the suggestion in this Essay. Id. at 563. However, the
court went on to suggest that comparative responsibility was consistent with the rationale for
alternative liability, but the court failed to articulate that rationale. Id. Later in its opinion, the court,
in responding to another argument, stated that the basis of alternative liability was the defendant's
acting in a way that deprived the plaintiff of the ability to prove her claim. Id. However, in the same
sense that the defendant's (and other tortfeasors') negligence in causing the plaintiff harm created the
difficulty of proof, so did the plaintiff's contributory negligence, without which the plaintiff would
not have been harmed and therefore would not have faced the difficulty ofproving which defendant's
negligence was a cause of the harm. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 175, at 429 (2000)
("[T]he strong moral basis for treating the negligent defendants as causes in fact of the harm could
become quite attenuated.").
18. See Arthur Larson, Third-PartyAction Over Against Workers' Compensation Employer,
1982 DuKE L.J. 483, 484 ("Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of workers'
compensation law is the question whether a third party in an action by the employee can get
contribution or indemnity from the employer, when the employer's negligence has caused or
contributed to the employee's injury."); see generally Thomas A. Eaton, Revisiting the Intersection
of Workers' Compensationand ProductLiability: An Assessment of a ProposedFederalSolution to
an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REV. 881 (1997).
Regarding the development of suits by injured employees against third-party product
manufacturers, see Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation,15 GA. L. REV. 925, 938 n.46 (1981) (suggesting that there was a paucity of suits
by injured employees against industrial machinery manufacturers in the pre-MacPhersonperiod);
Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality ofNegligence and the Ethics ofStrict Liability, 15 GA.L.REv. 963,
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several liability has changed the manner in which liability is apportioned, and it has
set the stage for courts so inclined to take further steps toward a more equitable
apportionment of liability by reducing or abrogating the employers' lien for workers
compensationpayments from atort recovery by employees.' 9 Another tertiary effect
in the strict products liability field is limiting the generous employment of
assumption ofrisk and misuse that occurred when contributory negligence was not
a defense.2"
Each ofthese developments has its own story. Nevertheless, I choose to focus
on yet another one-the impact of comparative responsibility concepts in the area
of proximate cause, specifically the idea of superseding causes that are said to "cut
off' the liability of a prior tortfeasor. Proximate cause and superseding cause play
a significant role in determining whether liability will be imposed on a tortfeasor
when another person's acts, especially culpable acts, occur after the tortfeasor's
conduct.2 This Essay focuses on intervening acts that might be characterized as
"unforeseeable" and which therefore have constituted superseding causes that
negate the liability of a prior tortfeasor. The change discussed is not solely
attributable to comparative responsibility, and so I must abandon the ripple
metaphor. Ripples do not intersect, so I cannot describe this development as the
confluence of several layers of ripples. Putting aside ripples, I merely observe that
comparative responsibility provides apowerful denouement to the evolution in legal
treatment of superseding causes.
This Symposium is devoted to products liability, and in keeping with that
subject matter, this Essay discusses the evolution of superseding cause law in the
products liability context. The field is rich enough and the role of superseding cause
in products liability cases is significant and varied enough to permit a full
explanation of the impact of comparative responsibility on superseding cause.
Although that is the focus in this Essay, there is no reason why this development is
or should be limited to such cases.
I want to disclaim any suggestion that I am the first to appreciate or advocate
the effect of comparative responsibility and its affiliated changes on superseding
cause. There has already been significantjudicial recognition of the need to rethink
superseding cause law in light of comparative responsibility. The Supreme Court
considered the matter in an admiralty case and concluded, contrary to the position
974 & n.57 (1981) (identifying the recent growth of third-party products claims by occupationally-

injured plaintiffs).

19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § B 19 cmt. 1(2000).
20. See DAVID A.FISCHER ET AL., PRODuCTS LIABILIY 571-78 (3d ed. 2002).
21. Doctrinally, intervening acts are not limited to human agency and include forces of nature.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965) (describing intervening "forces"). However, as
a perusal of the Second Restatement and superseding cause cases reveals, natural forces play an
exceedingly minimal role in the universe of superseding causes. See id. §§ 442-53. Only one section
in the SecondRestatementdeals explicitly with forces ofnature, and the rule it expresses-that natural
forces that produce harm of a different kind from the harm the risk of which made the defendant's
conduct negligent are superseding causes-is merely a reiteration of the basic proximate cause limit
on liability. Id. § 440. Thus, it offers no additional limitation on liability. Therefore, I focus on

conscious human agency as superseding causes in this Essay.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 15

1108

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 1103

presented here, that comparative responsibility does not affect proximate or
superseding cause doctrine. 2 A number of commentators also have ventured into
various aspects of the topic that I am pursuing.2 Although not original, I hope that
this effort serves as a reasonably coherent explanation and justification for this
unanticipated impact of comparative responsibility.
A few words about the reasons I chose this subject in light of the purpose of
this Symposium are appropriate at this point. In the latter part of the 1990s, I was
a co-Reporter, along with Bill Powers, for a portion of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts that addressed comparative responsibility and other apportionment issues.
While that Restatement confronted the issue about which I write in this Essay, the
Restatement recognized that the question was most appropriately resolved in a
Restatement that addressed the basic principles of tort law, including proximate
cause. 24 In 1996, Gary Schwartz was named the Reporter for the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liabilityfor PhysicalHarm (Basic Principles).' His assuming
responsibility for the Restatement that would address the major developments in the
core area of tort law since the Second Restatement, a third of a century before, was
fitting, as he was the Prosser of the modem generation. Gary is, in my view, the
premier torts academic of the latter part of the twentieth century. Had Gary lived,
he would have shepherded the issue about which I write through the American Law
Institute's labyrinth. His untimely death and my role, again with Bill Powers, in
completing Gary's work on the Liabilityfor PhysicalHarm Restatement provides

22. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830,836,839 (1996); see infra notes 110-31 and
accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 17, §§ 183, 187, at 451-52,463 (2000); VICTORE. SCmvARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 93-95 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the potential effect of comparative
negligence onproximate cause determinations); David W. Robertson, Love andFury: Recent Radical
Revisions to the Law of ComparativeFault,59 LA. L.REv. 175, 190-91 (1998); Terry Christlieb, Note,
WhySuperseding CauseAnalysisShould beAbandoned,72 TEx.L.REv. 161,181 (1993) (arguing that
superseding cause has no place in comparative fault systems). But see Richard W. Laugesen,
ColoradoComparative Negligence, 48 DENv. L.J. 469,486 (1972) ("[Clonsiderations ofproximate
cause under comparative negligence should theoretically remain as they existed before the
[comparative negligence] Act.").
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. c (2000)
("Comparative responsibility may affect what constitutes a superseding cause, butthatissue is beyond
the scope of this Restatement").
25. The universe that I address in this Essay is suits for personal injury or property damage. This
world includes contemporary products liability actions but excludes a substantial number oftort suits
in which the harm is economic loss or emotional distress. Consistent with our limited universe of
cases, I note that all of the modem Torts Restatements are limited to cases in which plaintiffs seek to
recover for personal injury or property damage. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 21 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (2000);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 4 (Tentative
DraftNo. 1,2001). Limitations on liability in those arenas are most often obtained through duty rules,
but proximate cause is also often employed, especially when the basis for suit is a statute which
proscribes conduct that causes economic loss.
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the reason for selecting this topic in this splendid memorial to a genuine giant in
modem tort law.26
The class of cases this Essay confronts include those such as Baker v.
InternationalHarvester Co.,2' in which a plaintiff's (or a plaintiff decedent's)
conduct is held to bar recovery on superseding cause grounds. In Baker, plaintiff s
decedent boarded a ladder on a farm combine with a gun for the purpose of hunting
from the combine.28 The driver of the combine was not initially aware of the
presence of plaintiffs decedent; after the driver discovered the presence of the
passenger and attempted to stop, plaintiff's decedent fell off and was killed2'
Plaintiff alleged a variety of defects in the design and warnings of the combine that
she claimed made it unreasonably dangerous." Without addressing this evidence,
the court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the ground that the use of
the combine 3by the decedent was neither intended nor anticipated by the
manufacturer. '
Another exemplary case, this time with a criminal act constituting the
superseding cause, is Delk v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 32 In Delk plaintiff sued the
manufacturer ofa rug alleged to be defective because of its flammability.33 Because
an arsonist was the source of ignition, which the court found to be a superseding
cause, the defendant was absolved of liability for the harm from the fire.34 The final
category of cases I would like to highlight is that of occupational injuries in which
a product manufacturer is absolved of liability because of the intervening acts ofthe
employer or a co-employee.35
What is common to all of these cases is that while the intervening act arguably
fell within the class of acts whose intervention prevented a prior tortfeasor from
being held liable, the harm that ultimately resulted was the sort of harm one might

26. During my collaboration with Bill Powers on the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
ApportionmentofLiability, he identified and we discussed many of the ideas contained in this Essay.
I cannot recall and identify each of his contributions to the ideas in this Essay, but they are enormous.
Any mistake, as is true of all of our collaborations, are mine alone.
27. 660 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 22-23.
30. Id. at 23.
31. In explaining its conclusion, the court characterized the use by the decedent quite
specifically, focusing on his unannounced and unexpected status-boarding the combine from the
ladder-and on his carrying of a gun. Id. Although the court did not use superseding cause
terminology, the "unanticipated use" language is often substituted in the products liability field. The
Baker court did invoke no-duty language with regard to the plaintiff's inadequate warning claim. Id.
32. 545 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Contrad'Hedouvillev. PioneerHotel Co., 552 F.2d 886,
894(9th Cir. 1977) (holding defendant carpet maker liable because it knew of the danger of arson and
failed to take appropriate safety measures).
33. Delk, 545 F. Supp. at 970.
34. Id. at 972.
35. See, e.g., Davis v. Komatsu Am. Indus. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (W.D. Tenn. 1999);
Muellerv. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 494 F. Supp. 275,277 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364
N.E.2d 267,271-72 (Ohio 1977).
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have expected to occur as a result of the defect in the product or of negligence by
the manufacturer.
II.

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

To appreciate the changes wrought by comparative responsibility and by the
modification ofjoint and several liability, I consider the days in which intervening
act and superseding cause law was developed and elaborated. 6 The prevailing
jurisprudence was that law was scientifically based and that correct legal principles
could be deduced through logical and objective inquiry. Consistent with this
philosophy, the proximate cause of any event could be determined through a

neutral, scientific inquiry. Rules regarding which intervening acts prevented prior
acts from being the cause of subsequent harm were integral to this inquiry. 7 Causes
were evaluated and analyzed to determine which was the proximate cause and
which were merely remote causes.3" Superseding causes "broke the chain of
causation," preventing antecedent conduct from being a proximate cause of harm.39
While courts and commentators appreciated that there was a distinction between
those conditions necessary for an outcome-factual causes-and the determination
of which was the proximate cause, ° the causal inquiry was viewed as a unitary,

36. Professor Patrick Kelley dates this period as the early nineteenth century, with proximate
cause not becoming well established until the 1840s. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in
Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 64 (1991).
37. An early, influential American case on proximate cause, Harrisonv. Berkley, 32 S.C.L. (1
Strob.) 525 (1847), declared: "The [causal] connexion is usually enfeebled, and the influence of the
injurious act controlled, where the wrongful act ofa third person intervenes, and where any new agent,
introduced by accident or design, becomes more powerful in producing the consequence, than the first
injurious act." Id. at 549.
38. Id. at 549; see Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequencesof an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv.
633 (1920); James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925).
39. See Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876) ("[W]hen there is
no intermediate efficient cause, the original wrong must be considered as reaching to the effect, and
proximate to it. The inquiry must, therefore, always be whether there was any intermediate cause
disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury."); Christianson
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 69 N.W. 640, 641 (Minn. 1896) ("Consequences which follow
an unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are
natural and proximate....").
40. See, e.g., Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause " at Common
Law, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 16,34, 35 (1909) (distinguishing necessary or but-for causes of an outcome
and explaining that when courts seek the cause of an injury, they are not engaged in finding some
inherent differences in the necessary conditions, but are inquiring into whether the harm that occurred
was within the duty imposed on the defendant to prevent it); McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 153-56
(discussing and distinguishing causation in fact from proximate cause).
The common law distinction between trespass cases, which required that the harm be directly
caused by the defendant, and case, which permitted recovery for indirectly caused harm, required
appreciation that, at least for some cases, there could be additional factual causes of an injury. See
infra note 41.
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objective inquiry conducted according to the formal rules establishedbylaw. 4 One
of the earliest torts treatises reveals a full appreciation of the many necessary causes
for an outcome.42 The authors go on to explain the impossibility of imposing
liability on all of the culpable causes and then articulate a rule to identify "the
proximate cause" that appears to be a "last wrongdoer" rule. 3 Thus, proximate
cause played a substantial role in limiting the reach of tort liability.'
There were, to be sure, cracks in the causal edifice. Nicholas St. John Green
wrote an essay in 1870 about proximate cause and argued that it was not a matter
of scientific inquiry and objectivity, but was determined by the purpose for which
the inquiry was conducted. Only after the cause of interest is identified based on
the reason for the inquiry can causes be separated into those that are proximate and
those that are remote." Therefore, proximate cause is not about time or space, but
rather is about the choice from among these necessary elements for an outcome
based on the needs of any particular inquiry.4 7 Harm that "prudent foresight" might
have avoided was proximately caused by negligence, Green claimed.4" But Green's
41. See Martin v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 19 S.W. 314,317 (Ark. 1892) (acknowledging
that defendant's breach of contract was a factual cause of the plaintiff s harm,but denying that it was
the 'juridical cause" of the harm because it was not "direct" and "proximate"); Gage v. Harvey, 48
S.W. 898, 898 (Ark. 1898) (noting that the "causal connection between negligence and damage is
broken by the interposition of independent responsible human action"); Gilman v. Noyes, 57 N.H.
627, 1876 WL 5348, at *3 (Aug. 11, 1876) (a jury question as to whether bear's destruction of sheep
was a "new cause," natural and reasonable, relieving defendant of liability for negligent failure to
secure fencing); Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 589 (1842) (giving ajury instruction in a "last
clear chance" case that if defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of harm,plaintiff could
recover despite his own contributory negligence); 45 C.J.S. Negligence § 489, at 928 (1928) (footnote
omitted) ("The law will not lookback from the injurious consequences beyond the last efficient cause,
especially where an intelligent and responsible human being has intervened."); Jeremiah Smith, Legal
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV.L. REv. 103,109 (1911). Cases such asMartin,Gage, and Gilman
were still exerting influence halfa century later. SeeLangstonv. Moseley, 265 S.W.2d 697,699 (Ark.
1954) (Ward, J., dissenting).
42. 1 THomAs G. SHEARiAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE

7 (1869); see also EDWARD P. WEEKS, THE DOCTRINE OF DAMNuM ABSQUE INJURIA [INJURY WITHOUT
WRONG] § 115, at 231 (1879) (citing John Stuart Mill and his "sum of all antecedents" explanation
of the causes of an event).
43. SHEARIAN & REDFIELD, supra note 42, at 8. The authors, however, identify the proximate
cause as the "firstlink" in the causal chain, rather than the last one. The inference that they meant by
the last wrongdoer is supported by their subsequent discussion of an exception to the rule, applicable
vhen the negligence is not "the nearest cause in the order of time." Id. Another prominent treatise of
the day is less helpful in explaining the role of proximate cause. I FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF
TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS (1859). It contains sketchy, confusing, and inconsistent references to the
law ofproximate cause. Compareid. at 90 (stating that cause cannot be established by "independent,
illegal acts of third persons") with id. at 94 (reciting the foresecability standard articulated by Baron
Pollock in Rigby v. Hewitt without identifying it as a concurring opinion).
44. For a more thorough account of the history of proximate cause, see Kelley, supranote 36,
at 54-105. This section on the history of proximate cause draws substantially on Professor Kelley's
work.
45. Nicholas St. John Green, Proximateand Remote Cause,4 AM. L. REV. 201,211-16 (1870).
46. Id. at213-14.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 215.
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work was largely ignored at the time. Baron Pollock of the Court of Exchequer is
credited with articulating a foreseeable consequences standard for proximate cause
in negligence cases in 1850, but he had to do so in concurring opinions.4 9 Pollock's
foreseeability test garnered some support in other cases until the Court of Appeal
decision in In re Polemis announced a direct-remote test for determining the scope
of liability. Yet, even when employing a foreseeability standard for harm that is
unusual, unexpected, or different in kind from the sort of harm risked by the tortious

conduct, superseding causes-those intervening human acts sufficiently significant
that we take notice of them--can still operate in a robust manner." Eventually, the
realist movement exposed many of the shrouds and mystiques of its jurisprudential
forebears; the concept that a single cause of an outcome could be identified in a
normative and objective fashion was just one of many early ideas that was later
debunked.52

Common law joinder rules of the day provided succor for a robust role for
proximate cause and the superseding cause subspecies.5 3 These rules prevented
joinder of those who acted independently to cause a plaintiff's injury.54 Plaintiffs
were limited to suing a single defendant, effectively imposing joint and several

liability on that defendant, who could be held liable for all damages.5" Others who
were negligent or acted intentionally, so long as they did not act in concert, could
not be joined in the action as parties.5 6 Within this procedural framework, the last
wrongdoer rule had the felicitous effect of limiting those whom the plaintiff could

sue successfully.57 Vicars v. Wilcox, a leading early nineteenth-century authority,

49. See Rigby v. Hewitt, 155 Eng. Rep. 103, 104 (1850) (Pollock, J., concurring); Greenland v.
Chaplin, 155 Eng. Rep. 104, 106 (1850) (Pollock, J., concurring).
50. In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560 (1921).
51. Indeed, that was the argument between Francis Wharton, a leading critic ofthe foresecability
cases, and Nicholas St. John Green. Wharton argued that the law need not concern itself with all of
the antecedent forces that are necessary causes. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 73-84 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bro., 2d ed. 1878). Only the acts of responsible individuals
could be addressed by the law, and theproximate cause was the last wrongdoer in the causal sequence,
Wharton insisted. Id. That Wharton's views were extreme is revealed by other contemporary and
conventional criticism of his views. See, e.g., WEEKS, supra note 42, § 129, at 271 (responding to
Wharton's argument that the causal connection is broken by subsequent plaintiff negligence by
inquiring whether it would be better to have the plaintiff and defendant bear the loss equally).
52. Leon Green published a text on proximate cause that clearly distinguished between factual
cause and liability limits and dismissed the language employed by courts to dress and categorize
causes as so much drivel. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 132-36 (1927). Roscoe
Pound later characterized Green's work as a "a real step forward." Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67 YALE
L.J. 1, 11 (1957).
53. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 44 (3d ed. 1964).
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. See Clifford v. Atl. Cotton Mills, 15 N.E. 84, 87 (Mass. 1888) ("[T]he general tendency has
been to look no further back than the last wrong-doer, especially when he has complete and intelligent
control of the consequences of the earlier wrongful act."); see also H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORt,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 277 (2d ed. 1985) (describing the last wrongdoer rule as a reflection of the
view that tort law should provide only one person for a plaintiff to sue); Laurence H. Eldredge,
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so declared.5 8 To be sure, exceptions were required when the rule led to a result that
imposed liability on a peripherally involved, but later acting, individual.
Even after the adoption of the procedural codes and more permissive joinder
rules in the mid-eighteenth century, joint and several liability provided a plaintiff
with a weapon that could be wielded to produce substantially unfair results.59 Joint
and several liability permits aplaintiffto sue any one or a combination ofthejointly
liable tortfeasors and to obtain ajudgment for the full amount of the damages." We
must remember that this rule operated at a time when contribution among joint
tortfeasors was unavailable." Thus, a defendant could be singled out by a plaintiff
and, despite paying the entirety of the plaintiff's judgment, could not obtain from
other tortfeasors their share of the plaintiff's harm.62 Thus, there remained a reason
to limit the number of persons who might be liable to the plaintiff even with
expanded joinder rules. Preferably, the devices employed would permit
identification of the most culpable tortfeasor. Otherwise, a plaintiff would be free
to sue and recover from a modestly culpable defendant who nevertheless carried a
larger purse than another more culpable but less wealthy person. The last
wrongdoer rule, which proved too maladroit to accomplish the goal, nevertheless
contributed to the effort to limit the number of parties who might be liable to the
plaintiff. Particularly when the intervening act was the product of intentionally
tortious or criminal behavior, superseding cause doctrine prevented a negligent
individual from bearing the entirety (or any) of the liability in which considerably
more culpable conduct played a role.63

CulpableIntervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 124-25 (1937) (describing the
evolution of the last human wrongdoer rule as an aspect of causation and its dissipation in the early
part of the twentieth century).
58. Vicars v. Wilcox, 103 Eng. Rep. 244,245 (1806).
59. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 875 (1939) stated a rule ofjoint and several liability.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 10 cmt. b (2000).

61. The rule against contribution is credited to Merryweatherv. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337,
1337 (1799), although thatcase involved two intentional tortfeasors. Nevertheless, therulewas carried
forward and applied in negligence actions until 1939, when the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act was first promulgated and was thereafter adopted by a substantial number of states.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23 cmt. a, Reporters' Note

(2000). Contribution was not provided for in the REsTATEMENTOF TORTS §875 (1939), but was added
in 1979 to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS (1979) in § 886A. Roscoe Pound commented on the
impact of expanded joinder rules and contribution among tortfeasors:
Today, asjoinderofindependent wrongdoers and contribution among tortfeasors
are possible, determination of the ambit of each of a number of negligences
relieves the law of much of the difficult balancing of interests which gave pause
when the whole loss had to fall upon one of the tortfeasors or else upon the
person injured.
Pound, supranote 52, at 11.
62. See Merryweather, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
63. See, e.g., Crandall v. Consol. Tel., Tel. & Elec. Co., 127 P. 994, 997 (Ariz. 1912) ("The
criminal act of a third party can never be the natural sequence in the link of circumstances leading up
to an injury, but, when such act is present, it must be considered as the efficient proximate cause of
the subsequent injury, and the law will not go beyond it for a proximate cause."). In Alexander v.
Town of New Castle, 17 N.E. 200, 201 (Ind. 1988), a defendant municipality which was allegedly
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To the extent that the growth of tort cases in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, driven by the Industrial Revolution, was thought to require limitations
because of the threat to burgeoning industry, a controversial proposition among
legal historians, superseding cause was already in place and was sufficiently robust
to assist in the effort.64

The influence of the last wrongdoer rule and its absolutist approach was largely

eroded by the early twentieth century.65 Despite the retreat from an outright bar,

superseding causes played aprominent role in providing all-or-nothing apportioning
of liability when there were multiple tortfeasors 6 Indeed, superseding causes were
employed to justify denying liability in a variety of instances in which courts
intuited
that liability should not be imposed and needed a doctrinal rationale for that
67
result.

negligent for leaving a sidewalk in disrepair by permitting an excavation to remain unenclosed was
exonerated when the plaintiff was thrown into the hole by a prisoner whom plaintiff was
accompanying from courthouse to jail. Id. The prisoner, an independent agent, was the superseding
cause of the plaintiff's harm. Id. Francis Wharton, the author of one of the leading torts treatises of
the mid-nineteenth century, championed this view. He argued that if without the intervention of
another responsible human agent the plaintiff would not have suffered injury, the defendant's
negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. See WHARTON, supra note 51, § 134.
Professors Hart and Honor6 display considerable sympathy for the idea that intentional conduct should
be a superseding cause of harm. HART & HONORS, supra note 57, at 74-75, 277-78.
64. Kelley, supra note 36, at 81 ("More and more cases seemed to be decided on proximate
cause grounds as the nineteenth century drew to a close."). Recent work by a legal historian suggests
another motivation for finding limits on liability. The effort to confine liability to negligently caused
harm required explanation in the period before negligence clearly displaced the existing strands of
strict liability. See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History ofAmerican Accident Law: Classical
Tort Law and the Cooperative First-PartyInsurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 745-60
(2001).
In a recent effort in this vein, Peter Karsten attempts to debunk the idea that proximate cause was
a vibrant doctrine limiting the liability of railroads in the late 1800s. PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS
HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW INNINETEENTH-CENTURy AMERICA 101-08 (1997). His account focuses on
the aberrational decision in Ryan v. New York CentralR.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), in which the court
limited the liability of a railroad that started a fire that spread to several structures as far as 130 feet
from the initial fire. Id. Karsten demonstrates that Ryan was atypical with regard to the limits on
liability that it imposed and that proximate cause was neither a new nor an especially helpful defense
for railroads; however, he does not address the superseding cause element of proximate cause or its
significance for defendants other than railroads. Id.
65. See Smith, supra note 41, at 118-23.
66. For a discussion of a turn-of-the-century English case that engaged in precisely this sort of
apportionment, albeit with other tortfeasors who were likely judgment proof because of their youth,
see Rabin, supra note 18, at 958 n.1 12. Professor Rabin concurs with the view that the superseding
cause doctrine is essentially a device that permits courts to void liability for a less culpable tortfeasor
than the superseding cause. Id.
67. A wonderful example ofthis use ofsuperseding cause doctrine is demonstrated in an article
by Charles Carpenter, who provided us with many of the classic causal hypotheticals that are still
employed in law school classrooms. He posited that a defendant negligently handed a loaded gun to
a child, who then dropped it and broke a bone. See Charles E. Carpenter, ProximateCause, 14 S.CAL.
L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1940). He explained that the reason for the defendant's exoneration was that the
child's dropping the gun was an unforeseeable intervening act that superseded the defendant's
negligence. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. f, illus. 3 (1965) (employing
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This approach is evident in an early article published by Francis Bohlen, the
Reporter for the firstRestatementof Torts.68 Criticizing a foreseeability standard as
a limitation on a negligent defendant's liability, Bohlen wrote that "the wrongdoer
should answer for all the consequence brought about by the working out of the
injurious tendency of his wrongful act until the ordinary natural laws of cause and
effect are divertedby some outside agency."69 Throughout the article, Bohlenrefers
to limits on liability in the language of cause: unbroken causal chains, agents that
break the causal chain, and intervening events that produce the injury to the
exclusion of the defendant's tortious conduct." Thus, it comes as no surprise that,
when the first Restatement of Torts was completed and published, it made no
distinction between cause in fact and limitations on liability that are today known
as proximate cause. A single inquiry---"legal cause"--was the terminology of the
Restatement, and that terminology was carried forward with but very modest
changes into the Restatement (Second) of Torts."
At the same time, contributory negligence by the plaintiff constituted a
complete bar to recovery.7 Whether the contribution of the plaintiff to her own
injuries was characterized as contributory negligence or as a superseding cause
made no difference in the outcome, and courts occasionally employed the latter
ground for denying liability when a plaintiff's unreasonable conduct was also a
cause of the harm.73

the same hypothetical but explaining the outcome based on the presence of harm beyond the risk
created by the defendant's conduct).
Another example occurred inMacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), the
case that swept away privity limitations, thereby creating the environment for strict products liability
to develop. Concerned about the implications ofthe decision, Judge Cardozo expressly disclaimed that
MacPherson'smitigation ofprivity would apply to anyone other than the manufacturer ofthe pro duct.
Id. at 1053. Thus, negligence by a component part manufacturer might be too remote, the
manufacturer's negligence in failing to inspect constituting a "break in the chain of cause and effect."
Id.
68. Francis Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in
Negligence, 49 AM. L. REG. 79, 148 (1901).
69. Id. at 80.
70. See id. at 86 ("unbroken chain of natural cause and effect"); id. at 149 ("outside agent
destroying the chain of cause and effect'); id. at 158 ("[N]egligence... was the natural, primary and
proximate cause" of the harm, despite unusual details in the manner in which the harm occurred.");
id. at 161 ("[L]iability... is to be determined by the natural consequences, those resulting from the
operation of the ordinary natural laws ....
").
71. See REsTATEMENTOFTORTs §§ 439-52 (1934); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 439-52
(1965).
72. See RESTATEMENTOFTORTS § 467 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 467 (1965).
73. There is at least one way in which the characterization might have made a difference in the
outcome. The last clear chance doctrine developed as a means to ameliorate the harshness of
contributory negligence. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. But last clear chance was only
an exception to the bar of contributory negligence, not a negation of superseding causes. See infra
notes 133-34 and accompanying text. Other ameliorative doctrines for contributory negligence would
similarly be unavailable when a plaintiff's conduct was instead treated as a superseding cause. Of
course, the decision to employ either contributory negligence or superseding cause may have been a
function of the egregiousness of the plaintiffs conduct, with the more serious conductbeing deemed
a superseding cause and the less severe contributory negligence. See Wright,supranote 13, at 74. In
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Even after contribution became established in the middle of the twentieth
century, it, along with indemnity, provided relatively blunt instruments for
apportioning liability when multiple defendants were involved. Contribution, until
the advent of comparative fault, was based on pro rata shares-no distinction was
made based on the comparative culpability of the parties. 74 Indemnity was also
available, but, like pro rata contribution, it was a relatively crude instrument that
shifted all of the loss to one party and left the other without liability.7 Although
indemnity was nominally limited to tortfeasors whose liability was vicarious or
otherwise legally imputed, the distinction between "active" and "passive"
tortfeasors developed and permitted indemnity for minor and modestly culpable
defendants from those who actedmore egregiously. 76 Courts usedindemnity despite
its technical inapplicability because it more closely reflected the relative culpability
of the parties than pro rata contribution; more refined tools for apportioning liability
were yet to come.77 So long as a highly culpable tortfeasor was judgment proof, as
many intentional tortfeasors are, the remaining solvent tortfeasors, regardless of
their respective degrees of culpability, would be held liable for the entire harm.7"
Superseding cause for highly culpable intervening parties and no-duty rules for
other instances of intentionally caused harm, concurring with negligence, provided
a way to avoid the otherwise inequitable apportionment of liability that existing
doctrine and the realities of insolvency might produce.
III. THE IMPACT OF COMPARATIVE RFsPONSiBILITY
What changes in this legal edifice have been wrought by comparative
negligence? The answer is "many," but the difference of interest here is the
diminished role for superseding cause. Before justifying that assessment, some of
the more obvious consequences of comparative negligence require identification.
Not only did comparative negligence remove the bar to recovery by a negligent
plaintiff, it also provided a reasonably refined method for apportioning liability
between a plaintiff and defendant.79 With contribution among joint tortfeasors
reasonably well-established, providing a highly graduated scale to apportion
liability among defendants also provided a much refined method compared to the
coarse two-unit scale of pro rata division or all-or-nothing, active-passive

that case, the ameliorative doctrines might well not have made any impact on the severely negligent
plaintiff, as they were frequently employed so as to leave the more culpable party between the plaintiff
and the defendant bearing the loss. See id. at 74 & n.72.
74. See PROSSER, supra note 53, § 48, at 278.
75. See id.
76. Id. § 48, at 279-80.
77. See id. § 48, at 279-8 1.
78. See id. § 48, at 280-81.
79. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 67, at 472 (5th ed. 1984). Of
course, modified comparative responsibility only provides that refinement to a point, then it returns
us to the crude all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence. Id. § 67, at 473-74.
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indemnity." Modestly culpable defendants could be assigned a modest proportion
of liability for the plaintiff's damages, and highly culpable defendants could be
assigned aproportion of liability in keeping with their role. Indemnity no longer had
to be deformed to do double duty by providing a more appropriate (if imperfect)
apportionment mechanism for defendants with vastly disparate culpability than pro
rata contribution offered."1
A bit less obvious, but more significant, development was the modification of
joint and several liability that followed the adoption of comparative negligence. The
rationale for joint and several liability was that, as between negligent defendants
and an innocent plaintiff, culpable defendants should bear the risk that another
wouldbe insolvent.8 2 That rationale no longer existed when contributory negligence
did not screen out all culpable plaintiffs and prevent them from recovering. 3 In the

80. See generallyJerry J. Phillips, Contributionand Indemnity in ProductsLiability, 42 TFNN.
L. REV. 85 (1974) (discussing the relationship between contribution and indemnification);
RESTATEMENT(THIRD)oF TORTS: APPORTIONMNT OF LIABIrLY § 22

cmt. e, Reporters'

Note (2000)

(noting that "active-passive" and "primary-secondary" indemnification "were developed before
comparative responsibility [and] ...
avoided the harsh effect of pro rata contribution when one of the
tortfeasors was substantially more culpable than the other").
81. A persuasive, if anecdotal, demonstration of the significance of comparative contribution
occurred in Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 S.W.3d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A truck
driver caught a telephone wire on his truck and pulled down a piece of a telephone pole that struck
and injured the plaintiff. Id. at427-28. Thewire was loosebecause, in an earlier incident, anunknown
driver had destroyed a guy wire. Id. at 428. The guy wire supported the telephone pole to which the
telephone wire was attached, which resulted in the telephone wire's descending low enough that the
truck snagged it when driving by. Id. In addressing the truck-defendants' contribution claim against
the telephone company for permitting its wires to be below a safe height, the trial court, sitting as
factfinder, concluded that the unknown driver who ruined the guy wire was "[t]he absolute most guilty
party in this matter" and found the unknown driver's action to be a superseding cause ofthe telephone
company's negligence. Id. at 428 n.3. (The court apparently did not appreciate that the superseding
cause occurred before the telephone company's negligence that it allegedly superseded.) Shortly
thereafter, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that contribution should be determined based on
comparative responsibility principles rather than on the previous pro rata basis. On post-trial motion,
the court vacated its prior superseding cause finding and awarded contribution to the truck-defendants
based on assignments of comparative responsibility to the truck-defendants, the telephone company,
and the unidentified driver.
82. See supranotes 11-13 and accompanying text.
83. To be sure, some of the move away from joint and several liability was fueled by tort reform
efforts and complaints about efforts to target deep pockets. The adoption of comparative fault and the
loss of the rationale for joint and several liability would not justify a pure several liability scheme,
even when the plaintiff was determined to be comparatively negligent, nor would it justify the
modification ofjoint and several liability when the plaintiff was not at fault. Compare Aaron D.
Twersld, The Joint TortfeasorLegislative Revolt: A RationalResponse to the Critics,22 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 1125 (1989) with Richard W. Wright, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: A Reply
to ProfessorTwerski, 22 U.C. DAVISL. Rnv. 1147 (1989). The expansion of tort law in the latter half
of the twentieth century, including the use of tort law incentives to provide better security efforts to
prevent crime, no doubt contributed to the deep-pocket reform backlash. See Robert L. Rabin,
EnablingTorts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 443-46 (1999); Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as TortLaw
Un-makers: Recent CaliforniaExperience with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 472-74.
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wake of comparative fault, the majority of states have modified their rule ofjoint
and several liability for independent tortfeasors. 4

Yet another change wrought by the availability of a comparative methodology
for apportionment of liability is the willingness of many courts to include
intentional tortfeasors with other tortfeasors in the assessment of comparative
responsibility."5 Thus, when negligent tortfeasors concur with

84. States have adopted a variety of systems that entail hybrids of joint and several liability,
depending on thresholds of comparative fault, types of claims, types of damages, and other factors.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17 cmt. a (2000). Only ten
jurisdictions with comparative negligence regimes retain joint and several liability. Id. § 17 cmt a,
Reporters' Note.
85. The Restatement (Third)of Torts: Apportionment ofLiability identifies tenjurisdictions that
have approved comparing intentional tortfeasors with other nonintentional tortfeasors and five that
have refused to do so. Id. § 1 cmt. c, Reporters' Note. A post-Restatement case declining to permit
apportionment between a negligent defendant and a nonparty intentional tortfeasor is Brandon v.
County ofRichardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 620 (Neb. 2001). Many of the fivejurisdictions that declined
to permit comparative apportionment among negligent and intentional tortfeasors felt constrained, in
varying degrees, by the state's comparative fault statute. See. e.g., Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss.,
Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 282 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that Mississippi's comparative fault statute, which
explicitly excludes intentional tortfeasors, bars assignment of comparative responsibility to such
tortfeasors).
Some jurisdictions with several liability have declined to permit comparative apportionment
between an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor in a narrow context that does not speak
to the more general proposition. These cases involve a defendantwho was negligentprecisely because
of the risk of an intentional tort and the defendant's failure to take adequate precautions to protect the
plaintiff from this risk. In a jurisdiction with several liability, permitting comparative apportionment
between these defendants would often reduce the negligent defendant's liability to a fraction of the
damages for the harm, thereby removing a great deal of the incentive to adopt the adequate security
precautions intended by the tort obligation in the first place. See, e.g., Bhinder v. Sun Co., No.
CV960153767, 2001 WL 1284143 at *4-*6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2001) (applying legislation
enacted after a prior decision which had held that responsibility could be apportioned between a
criminal who shot plaintiffs decedent to death and defendant which failed to provide adequate
security to protect against criminal activity at a twenty-four-hour convenience store); Kan. State Bank
& Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587,606 (Kan. 1991) ("Negligent tortfeasors
should not be allowed to reduce their fault by the intentional fault of another that they had a duty to
prevent.");Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 719 (La. 1994) ("As a
general rule, we find that negligent tortfeasors should not be allowed to reduce their fault by the
intentional fault of another that they had a duty to prevent."); Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
98-CA- 1013, 1999 WL 199296, at *14 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999) (holding that because negligent
defendant breached duty to protect plaintiff from criminal act, no apportionment to armed robber was
permitted); McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229, 242-43 (N.D. 1992) (permitting negligent
defendant to reduce liability based on rapist's comparative responsibility would be neither fair nor
just); Brandon, 624 N.W. 2d at 620 (expressing the concern that it would be "irrational" to permit a
defendant, negligent for failure to protect against the risk ofcriminal assault, to reduce liability based
on that criminal assault); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McDonald, 676 So. 2d 12, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) ("The public policy underlying our construction of [the comparative responsibility statute] is
that negligent tortfeasors such as Wal-Mart and Merrill Crossings should not be permitted to reduce
their fault by shifting it to another tortfeasor whose intentional, criminal conduct was a foreseeable
result of their negligence."); Slawson v. Fast Food Enters., 671 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
On the one hand Burger King owed a duty to protect [the victim, a patron] from
foreseeable intentional assaults by other patrons; but on the other hand, Burger
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intentional tortfeasors to cause harm to another, liability is often apportioned among
the defendants based on comparative responsibility principles. Thus, comparative
contribution becomes available even when an intentional tortfeasor concurs with
other nonintentional tortfeasors to cause harm in a joint and several liability
jurisdiction. Additionally, in a jurisdiction with several liability, the negligent
tortfeasor's liability is limited to its comparative share of the damages.86
Comparative fault and comparative contribution recognize the reality that many

tortious acts may concur to cause the same harm. While recognizing that reality,
comparative methodology also provides a mechanism for apportioning liability for
the harm among all of the tortfeasors in some rough approximation to the
culpability of each.
IV. CONTEMPORARY PROXIMATE CAUSE LIMITS ON SCOPE OF LIABILITY

To complete the setting for this discussion of the impact of comparative
responsibility on superseding cause, I consider existing legal limits on the scope of
a tortfeasor's liability. I address here limits that the law imposes even when tortious
conduct is the factual cause of cognizable legal harm. That there must be some limit
to the liability of a tortfeasor whose conduct causes harm is unexceptional. We
cannot imagine holding Eve liable for all of the harm that has occurred since
humankind was turned out of the Garden of Eden. Factual causal chains can extend
in extraordinary and fortuitous ways, and limits there must be. No-duty rules and
proximate cause are the two doctrinal means by which those limits have been
accomplished. While there is considerable overlap, I leave aside no- and limitedduty rules, which are questions of law decided by courts and, most frequently and
appropriately, consist of specific, clear rules that apply to categories of cases or
classes of actors. Thus, the provision that there is no duty to rescue eliminates
liability for all of those whose actions did not contribute to creating the risk that
imperils another. Proximate cause limits, by contrast, are dependent on the specific
facts of a case and, unlike duty limitations, are decided by the fact-finder.

King contends, it is entitled ... to diminish or defeat its liability for the breach
of that duty by transferring it to the very intentional actor it was charged with
protecting her agairist.
Id.; Prime Hospitality Corp. v. Simms, 700 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming
principle of Slawson).
Declining to permit comparative apportionment in this situation so as to, in effect, negate the
provision for several liability and to make the negligent tortfeasorjointly and severally liable does not
speak to the desirability of comparative apportionment between intentional and negligent tortfeasors
outside of the failure-to-protect context. An alternative means to accomplish the goal sought by the
courts that refuse to permit comparative apportionment in this context is to make a tortfeasor who
failed to protect against an intentional tort liable not only for the former's comparative share of
responsibility but also for the latter's. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 14 (2000). Significantly, for the thesis of this Essay, the courts that have refused to permit
apportionment to an intentional tortfeasor for this reason are doing so to expand the liability of the
negligent tortfeasor vho failed to protect, not to contract it.
86. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, § 67, at 475.
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While there are multiple approaches to the proximate cause problem of
imposing workable limits on a defendant's liability,87 the predominant one
employed today requires that the harm for which a plaintiff seeks to recover be one
of the harms whose risk made the defendant's conduct tortious.88 In a negligence
case, in which a defendant is only required to anticipate and to take precautions
against foreseeable harms, that limit becomes one that requires that the risk of harm
suffered by the plaintiff be reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's
negligence. The defendant's liability extends to harms that came to fruition as a
result of risks that made the defendant's failure to take greater care negligent. Thus,
the risk standard limits liability to harms that were within the purview of the reason
for holding the defendant liable in the first place. These same limits also apply to
plaintiffs negligence. Even if the plaintiffs contributory negligence is a factual
cause of harm, the harm must be among the harms whose risks made the plaintiff s
conduct negligent. Otherwise, the plaintiffs negligence is not a proximate cause of
harm and should have no effect on the parties' respective liability for the plaintiffs

damages.
However, foreseeability, even when anchored to the time when the defendant
acted and to the harms that might have been anticipated to result from the deficient
conduct, leaves some proportion of cases indeterminate. Reasonable people might
well resolve these cases in different ways or might candidly confess that they have
little clue about how the case should be resolved. This indeterminacy provides
courts considerable leeway to characterize an intervening event in a preferred

87. See DOBBS, supra note 17, § 180, at 444 (2000) ("The most general and pervasive approach
to proximate cause holds that a negligent defendant is liable for all the general kinds of harms he
foresceably risked by his negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that
conduct."); see also 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.5, at 138 (2d ed. 1986)
The view currently prevailing in this country, however, does limit the scope of
the duty to do or refrain from doing a given act to (1) those persons that are
likely to be endangered by the act or omission, and (2) harm (to such person or
interest) from a risk the likelihood ofwhich made the act or omission negligent.
KEETON ET AL., supranote 79, § 43, at 297 ("[T]he conclusion may well be drawn that... the 'scope
of the foreseeable risk' is on its way to ultimate victory as the criterion ofwhat is 'proximate,' if it has
not already achieved it.").
88. However, I say this with some caution. Often, one can find strands of a direct/remote test
and a hindsight foreseeability test, the predominant alternatives to a harn-within-the-risk standard,
in the same judicial opinion, without any acknowledgment of a difference among these three rules.
See, e.g., Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396,402 (Alaska 1985) (using hindsight foreseeability and
scope of the foreseeable risk); Salem v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (Ct. App. 1989)
(applying foreseeability and remote-consequences language to deny recovery in a dramshop case);
Stahl v. Metro. Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14, 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (equating harm within the
risk to extraordinary or bizarre outcomes); Galbreath v. Eng'g Constr. Corp., 273 N.E.2d 121, 129
(Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (using remote versus direct and event within bounds of foreseeability in
proximate cause analysis).
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fashion89 and thereby to rule as a matter of law, although the clear trend has been
to leave resolution of these questions to the fact-finder.
A second aspect to proximate cause limits on liability is that the harm must be
one whose risks were increased by the tortious or negligent aspect of the
defendant's conduct. Although the harm may have been foreseeable and the
defendant's negligence a factual cause of the harm, the connection between the
negligence and the harm may be one of pure fortuity. A speeding driver struck by
lightning that propels the speeding car into another's would not have been in the
precise location where lightning struck if the driver were complying with speed
limits. Yet, the risks ofharm created by speeding had no role in causing the injury
to the other car. But for the random timing of the lightning, the speed at which the
plaintiff was driving was irrelevant to the harm. The risk of this particular type of
accident is unaffected by whether the driver was complying with the speed limit.9"
These limitations on liability remain unaffected by the advent of comparative
fault. These rules are purely about the scope of a tortfeasor's liability and unlike
superseding cause doctrine do not implicate issues of apportioning liability when
there are multiple persons whose tortious acts caused the plaintiff's harm. To put
the point differently, limiting liability to harms among the risks created by the
defendant's conduct is as appropriate when the there is a single potential tortfeasor
that caused the harm as when there are multiple such actors involved.
Superseding cause rules supplement the limits sketched out above. Especially
among courts that employ direct/remote language for proximate cause, the number
and quality of intervening causes that can be identified bear strongly on the
assessment of whether the harm is too "remote" for liability to be imposed.9' Even
courts that employ a risk or foreseeability standard find additional limitations on
liability in the doctrine of superseding causes.92

89. See Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1152 (6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Kentucky
products liability statute as barring liability if product alteration is a cause of the injury); Hanlon v.
Cyril Bath Co., 541 F.2d 343, 345 (3d Cir. 1975); DOBBS, supra note 17, § 190, at 472 (discussing
cases in which courts declared intentional conduct unforeseeable); Kelley, supra note 36, at 92-93.
90. One might reformulate this limitation on liability as an aspect of factual cause. Judge Keeton
urged that if the tortious act was described based on the risks that it created, limits on liability could
be performed with a factual cause analysis. See ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE iNTHE LAW OF

TORTS (1963). Thus, the risks created by the speeding driver were that he would lose control or would
notbe able to avoid other traffic or pedestrians. See id.The risks posed by the driver's excessive speed
thus were not a factual cause of the harm. Id.
91. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1879); Pittsburgh
Forge & Iron Co. v. Dravo Contracting Co., 116 A. 147, 149 (Pa. 1922) (noting that the facts must
"show a continuous succession of events" for a result to be considered "the natural one");
McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 157-60 (describing proximate cause in terms of intervening acts that
render the defendant's conduct remote as opposed to direct).
92. See, e.g., Cascone v. Herb Kay Co., 451 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Ohio 1983) (discussing'new and
independent" acts which "absolve[ ] the original negligent actor"); Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845
S.W.2d 173, 182 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that arapist was superseding cause of defendant-developer's
negligence in leaving keys for all homes in an uncompleted development in a central location where
construction employees had access). A frequently expressed principle of proximate cause is that the
manner in which the harm occurs has no bearing on the outcome. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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In the middle of the twentieth century, the law regarding superseding causes
evolved considerably to accommodate the expansion of liability theories and of the
duty to take precautions against third-party negligent and intentional conduct.93
When the sole source of the risk consisted of third-party conduct and tort law
expanded the obligation of merchants, landlords, employers, and other enterprise
actors capable ofpreventing harm caused by the criminal acts of others, superseding
cause law necessarily conformed. An innkeeper with a duty to take reasonable care
to prevent physical attacks on guests cannot be relieved of liability on proximate
cause grounds when precisely the risk that the innkeeper was to take precaution
against comes to fruition and harms the plaintiff. To take away with superseding
cause what tort law has increasingly established in recent decades by expanding
duty concepts would be like purchasing a car with optional side air bags and then
removing them.
Courts have readily resolved such cases by observing that a foreseeable
intervening act is not a superseding cause.94 That rule, in widespread use, is benign

in cases in which the intervening act created precisely the risk against which the
defendant was to protect. But it may be misleading because in some cases it fails
to focus on the matter of importance. When the foreseeable, intervening act is the
source of the risk-a criminal, for instance-the harm that results will be the harm
whose risk-the intervening act-made the defendant negligent. However, what
about the situation in which the intervening act is not reasonably foreseeable-a
standard sufficiently malleable that it arises with frequency-but the harm that
occurs is harm of the sort against which the defendants failed reasonably to protect?
Thus, a contractor excavating in the middle of a sidewalk has a duty of care to
prevent pedestrians from falling into the excavation. Does breach of that obligation
also result in liability when a careless pedestrian does not see the excavation or
when a mugger pushes a victim into the hole? A product manufacturer must design
its prpduct to make it reasonably safe. Does the manufacturer's liability extend to
harm caused by an uncrashworthy design that concurs with another's road rage to
cause the plaintiff harm? Does the answer to this question turn on the foreseeability
of road rage? It is to these sorts of cases that I turn.

TORTS § 281 cmt. c, illus. 2 (1965); see also id. § 435(1) ("[T]hc fact that the actor neither foresaw
'nor should have foreseen... the manner in which [the harm) occurred does not prevent him from
being liable."); RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FORPHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)

§ 29 cmt. o (Tentative DraftNo. 2,2002). A risk standard for limiting liability in conjunction with this
principle should diminish the role of intervening acts for purposes of limiting liability. See HART &
HONORt, supra note 57, at 287; DOBBS, supra note 17, § 189, at 469-70.
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
§ 19 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001); Rabin, supra note 83, at 435.
94. See, e.g., Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1995); Bell v. Bd. of
Educ., 687 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (N.Y. 1997); Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217,219 (Utah
1983); see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REv. 941,998-1000 (2001).
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V. THE END OF SUPERSEDING CAUSES?
The first incursion by comparative responsibility on superseding causes is that
courts can no longer use a plaintiff's conduct alternatively as a superseding cause
or contributory negligence.95 When both superseding cause and contributory
negligence had the same effect on the outcome of the case, such alternative use,
while imprecise, had no effect on the outcome-the plaintiff lost.96 With
comparative responsibility, the negligent plaintiff no longer loses, and courts can
no longer afford to characterize a plaintiff's negligence that merely concurs with the
defendant's negligence to cause harm as a superseding cause.9
Let us reconsider one of the cases with which this Essay began. Recall that in

Baker v. InternationalHarvester Co., the plaintiffs decedent was hunting after
hitching a ride on a combine being operated by another.9" After the driver observed
the hunter on the combine, he began to stop the combine to request that the hunter
leave.99 In the interim, the hunter fell off of the combine and was killed.'00 Plaintiff

presented evidence of three different design defects and also claimed that a better
warning of the dangers of riding on the combine should have been provided.'
Declining to address these claims, the court affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict for the defendant on the ground that riding the combine with a gun for
hunting without the knowledge of the operator was neither intended nor foreseeable
and therefore constituted an abnormal use that barred recovery.' 2
Perhaps the court concluded that the combine was as safe as it was required by
law to be and therefore was not defective. That proposition seems dubious, based
on the language the court employed, its indifference to the design defect claims
propounded by the plaintiff, and its failure to engage in an assessment of the risks

95. Interestingly, the first case identified as invoking proximate cause to deny recovery, Flower
v. Adam, 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (1810), concluded that the lack of skill of the plaintiff-rider in
controlling his horse in a dust storm attributed to the defendant's nuisance was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries. See generally Christopher Dove, Note, Dumb as a Matter of Law: The
"SupersedingCause" Modificationof Comparative Negligence,79 Tnx. L. RPv 493 (2000).
96. The SecondRestatementcarefully distinguished between the acts ofthe plaintiff and the acts
of third parties in defining superseding causes. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965)
("[A] superseding cause is an act of a thirdperson or other force which by its intervention prevents
the actor from being liable for harm to anotherwhich his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor
in bringing about.") (emphasis added). TheRestatement did include several specific instances inwhich
it declared that certain conduct, including a plaintiffs, was not a superseding cause of harm. Id.
§§ 444-46.
97. For cases in which courts continue to employ superseding cause doctrine with regard to a
plaintiff's conduct, see Dove, Note, supra note 95, at 503-30.
98. Baker v. Int'l Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Superseding cause determinations in products liability cases are sometime put in terms
of substantial change, based on the language of § 402A, or misuse. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. m (1998).
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that existed in the combine when someone rode along on it."0 3 Indeed, it appears the
court meant what it said-plaintiffs decedent's riding a combine without
permission or knowledge of the operator to hunt was a behavior that barred him
from recovery.'
The difficulty with this conclusion is that it sounds like the court has ruled that
contributory negligence bars the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. But
contributory negligence was not a defense in Missouri to a strict products liability
case at the time of Baker."5 Therefore, superseding cause became the surrogate
basis for barring the plaintiff's claim. But should it have?
That depends on whether the combine posed risks of a rider falling off that
reasonably could have been ameliorated by a design change.106 I do not know how
often there are riders on combines and the frequency with which they fall off and
are injured, but I am inclined to doubt that the risk was substantial enough to
warrant modification of the machine. Be that as it may, there is some substantial
possibility that a jury, after the evidence on this matter is developed, should be the
entity making that decision. Of course, if the product is exonerated, we need not
consider the role of the plaintiffs actions. But if the combine were found to pose
unacceptable danger to riders, then we must account for the plaintiffs behavior.
The Bakercourt's decision barring the claim evaded Missouri law that contributory
negligence was not a defense in a strict liability action. 10 7 Once comparative fault
was made applicable to strict products liability suits, the fact that the plaintiffs
actions were foolish, risky, and unneighborly would certainlyjustify a comparative
fault instruction, but not a superseding cause resolution.'
One might object that permitting lawsuits by egregiously culpable plaintiffs to
recover a small fraction of their harm is not good public policy-the transaction
costs of such claims are simply not worth whatever benefits such suits may provide.
Moreover, egregiously culpable plaintiffs are undeserving of any recompense by
other, less culpable wrongdoers. That objection has some currency, but is

103. See Baker, 660 S.W.2d at 23.
104. Id.
105. See Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491,493 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). Missouri
enacted a comparative fault statute applicable to strict products liability actions in 1987. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.765 (West 1987).
106. The answer also depends on whether the dangers posed by the combine were beyond the
expectations ofa reasonable consumer or user of the combine, in a consumer expectations jurisdiction.
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. A sometimes employed proxy for superseding cause, sole proximate cause, raises the same
issue as to the appropriateness of applying it to a plaintiff's conduct once comparative responsibility
is enacted. See Everly v. Columbia Gas of W. Va., Inc., 301 S.E.2d 165, 166-68 (W. Va. 1983).
In Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,766 N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 2002), the court reversed a
judgment for defendant in a crashworthiness claim. Plaintiff's decedent was intoxicated, which
caused the car to crash. The lower court held that decedent's intoxication was the sole proximate
cause of the death. The court appreciated that both the intoxication and a defective condition in the
care could have been factual causes of the death. The court then went on to observe that to bar the
plaintiff from recovery because ofthe serious misconduct ofthe decedent would be inconsistent with
comparative fault principles.
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substantially undercut for three reasons. As a practical matter, a small percentage
of anything but very substantial damages will not be an attractive lawsuit for a
contingent-fee lawyer. Second, the comparative fault systems largely extant today
are modified systems, which generally impose a threshold of the plaintiff being
assigned no more than fifty percent of the comparative responsibility." 9 This
threshold already overperforms the function of excluding egregiously culpable
plaintiffs. Even in those jurisdictions that have pure comparative fault, a rule that
denies recovery unless a plaintiff is below a certain low threshold-say fifteen
percent-better responds to the administrative cost objection than applying
superseding cause as a surrogate to screen cases that are not thought to be worth the
efforts to process. Finally, if we truly believe that egregiously more culpable parties
should bear responsibility for all damages, we would need, reciprocally, a doctrine
that a plaintiff's modest comparative responsibility is ignored when a defendant is
found largely responsible.
The Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc.," an
admiralty case, appears to contradict the position advocated here. The owner of a
tanker sued a mooring facility (and related parties), alleging the defendants'
negligence caused the loss of the ship."' At trial, the court, sitting as fact-finder,
determined that the lapses by the tanker's captain constituted gross negligence and
that one particularly egregious steering decision was "unforeseeable."' 2 On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that with the adoption of comparative responsibility in admiralty
actions, proximate cause and superseding cause were unnecessary and should be
abandoned." 3 Apparently, plaintiff argued that all proximate cause limitations
should be displaced once comparative responsibility was in place, not just
superseding cause." 4 That extreme position"' distracted attention from the more

109. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, § 67, at 473.

110. 517 U.S. 830 (1996).
111. Id. at 834.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 835.
114. Id. at 835-36. The Court provides conflicting statements about whether the plaintiff made
the limited argument that only superseding cause was displaced by comparative responsibility or

argued that all proximate cause limitations on liability should be discarded. Compare id. at 836
(stating that the plaintiff argued "superseding cause doctrine.., should not apply in admiralty") with
id. (stating that the plaintiffs "argument [was] that the proximate cause requirement, and the related
superseding cause doctrine... should not be applicable in admiralty"). Those are very different
arguments. Petitioner's briefs largely focused on superseding cause. See Petitioners' Brief on the
Merits at 29-32, Sofec (No. 95-129). But petitioner also asserted that so long as a party's negligence
was a factual cause of the harm, apportionmentbased on comparative responsibility was required, and
petitioner further argued that all proximate cause limits should be discarded because of the confusing
nature of the doctrine. See id. at 29; Petitioners' Reply Brief on the Merits at 9, Sofec (No. 95-129).
Hence, the petitioners' raised the question of whether any proximate cause limits survived the
adoption of comparative responsibility.
Apparently, the reason that proximate cause was involved in Sofec, in addition to superseding
cause, was that the trial court, after concluding that the plaintiff's captain's negligence was a
superseding cause, gilded the lily by also finding that the captain's acts were the sole proximate cause

of the harm. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 835. Once the court concluded that the captain's negligence was a
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modest and more persuasive claim: superseding cause limitations of liability that
go beyond the basic limitations imposed by proximate cause are inappropriate once
comparative responsibility and comparative contribution are available as liability
apportioning devices. A substantial portion of the Sofec Court's opinion is devoted
to justifying the unexceptional proposition that proximate cause limitations on
liability remain necessary despite apportionment based on comparative
responsibility." 6 But the Court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that rules of
superseding cause should be eliminated." 7 Admiralty decisions by the Court, of
course, are not binding on state courts which decide their own tort law, but Supreme
Court decisions in admiralty tend to cast a significant shadow on state tort law."18
Yet, I think that a plausible reading of Sofec renders it not inconsistent with the
position that comparative fault does affect the invocation of superseding cause both
as applied to plaintiffs' conduct as well as to third-party conduct. In any case, the
Court's reasoning in reaching the conclusion that superseding cause remains
unaffected by comparative responsibility, as explained below, is not compelling.
Sofec entailed negligence by a mooring facility that enabled the plaintiffs oil
tanker to escape its mooring. 19 However, the captain of the ship was aboard at the
time, and after successfully avoiding hazards created by the escape, he maneuvered
the ship out to sea. 2' At that point the captain was negligent in several aspects in
navigating the ship and failed to ascertain the ship's position. 2' As a result, the ship
ran aground on a reef and sustained severe damage that resulted in a complete loss
of the ship.' 22
One can read Sofec as a case in which the risk of the captain's failure to
ascertain the ship's position was unaffected by the defendant's negligence in
mooring the ship. By that I mean that none of the risks that made the mooring
company's conduct negligent came to fruition. To illustrate, let me change the facts
of Sofec so that after the oil tanker escaped, the captain decided that, rather than
returning to the mooring facility, he would proceed with the load of cargo to the
destination at which he would have arrived the following day. During the trip, a
freak storm developed and destroyed the ship. While the mooring company's

superseding cause, the sole proximate cause conclusion necessarily followed and contributed no
additional basis for the outcome. Id.
115. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
116. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 836-39.
117. Id.
118. The Supreme Court's decision in EastRiver S.S. Corp. v. TransamericaDelavalInc., 476
U.S. 858,876 (1986), holding that damage to the product itselfis economic loss and outside the scope
of recovery in tort under admiralty law, has been quite influential among state courts. See, e.g., Coop.
Power Ass'n v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 493 N.W.2d 661, 667 (N.D. 1992) (adopting the rationale
of East River Steamship); MARCA. FRANKLIN & ROBERTL. RABIN, ToRTLAw AND ALTERNATIVES 644

(7th ed. 2001) (discussing state courts' widespread acceptance of East River Steampship);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. d, Reporters' Note (1998) (same).
119. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 832-33.
120. Id. at 833.
121. Id. at 833-34.
122. Id. at 834.
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negligence was a factual cause of the harm, it was not a proximate cause because
the risks that made it negligent did not include a freak storm. Its negligence in
relation to the harm is the same as the speeding driver struck by lightning."2
On this account of the Sofec case, the defendant's negligence was merely
coincidental with the captain's navigational defaults. 124 To the extent Sofec can be
read as limited to requiring that an actor's tortious conduct increase generally the
risk of the harm that subsequently occurs, it is consistent with the proximate cause
limits that must exist in any case."rs However, the Sofec Court did not explicitly
limit its decision in that fashion, and language in the opinion goes beyond the
limited reading of the case set forth above.
The Sofec Court's reasoning on superseding causes is not persuasive. Aside
from the Court's rejection of the petitioners' argument for eliminating proximate
cause entirely, it provided a single reason for retaining superseding cause
limitations on liability-they are neither internally inconsistent nor repugnant to
comparative responsibility.1 26 While that may be true, this
123. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
124. The trial judge found, and the Court reiterated, albeit in denying plaintiff's contention, that
the trial court's findings of fact on superseding cause were clearly erroneous and that "the captain's
failure to plot fixes... 'was entirely independent ofthe fact of breakout."' Sofec, 517 U.S. at 841 n.3.
125. For an analysis ofSofec similar to that above, see DOBBS, supra note 17, § 196, at 490; cf.
Wolfe v. Stork RMS-Protecon, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 264, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
manufacturer of a conveyor system was not liable on proximate cause grounds when a subsequent
modification of the system created the risk that banned the plaintiff, despite a prior decision of the
court that comparative fault obviated the use of superseding cause).
126. To be precise, the not "internally inconsistent" claim was specifically attributed to
proximate, rather than superseding, cause. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 837. Because of the similarity between
inconsistency and repugnancy, I reiterate and treat both here as about superseding cause.
The Court also cited and quoted an admiralty treatise that made the same claim, albeit in
conclusory terms: "[T]he superseding cause doctrine can be reconciled with comparative negligence.
Superseding cause operates to cut off the liability of an admittedly negligent defendant, and there is
properly no apportionment of comparative fault where there is an absence of proximate causation."
Id. at 837-38 (quoting THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTYAND MARITIME LAIV § 5-3, at 166 (2d ed.
1994)).
The Court also stated, relying on the defendants' brief, that ofthe forty-six jurisdictions adopting
comparative fault, forty-four retained superseding cause. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 838. The statement is
incorrect. While I have not canvassed every jurisdiction, the latest draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: LiabilityforPhysicalHarm (BasicPrinciples)§ 33 cmt. c, Reporters' Note (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2002) cites opinions decided before Sofec in 1996 from seven jurisdictions that recognize the
impact of comparative responsibility on superseding cause. A leading treatise on comparative
responsibility identifies several other jurisdictions in which the author concludes that the court was
influenced by the availability of comparative responsibility to diminish the scope of superseding
cause. See ScmVARTZ, supra note 23, § 4-3(a), at 93-95 (describing several cases in which the
adoption of comparative fault influenced the court to expand liability to a defendant who was only
marginally responsible); see alsoHENRY WOODs, THENEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVEFAULT § 5:1,
at 94 (1978) (observing that while comparative responsibility should not affect proximate cause, it
might result in courts being more lenient on superseding cause). In addition, a very good student note
thatboth discussed the difference between proximate cause and superseding cause and explained why
the latter should not survive adoption of comparative responsibility went unrecognized and uncited
by the Court (and the parties). See generally Christlieb, supranote 23.
The fifty-one cases cited in the defendants' brief and relied on by the Court are underwhelming
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is support of the proposition for which the court referred to them: forty-four states continue to
recognize and use superseding cause since their adoption of comparative fault. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 83738. In forty-two of the cases (identified below), the Court never considered the issue of the
compatibility of superseding cause with comparative responsibility. In twenty-three of those cases,
there was some potential superseding cause to which the Court referred, and the case was one in which
comparative responsibility was available and could have been assigned to the potential superseding
cause. However, in nineteen of these cases, the superseding cause was an immune or a non-party and
thus not eligible for assignment of comparative responsibility under the rules then in existence in those
jurisdictions.
In two other cases, neither comparative fault nor superseding cause were issues before the court.
One case was decided when contributory negligence was still the governing law. Thus, only six cases
contain explicit discussions of the possible effects of comparative negligence on superseding cause.
One of these confines that discussion to the narrow facts of custodial suicide cases.
I find it astonishing that the United States Supreme Court would accept so uncritically the
contents of an adversary's brief and employ it in support of its decision and for the implicit
proposition that forty-four of forty-six jurisdictions rejected the petitioners' claim with what had to
be no independent review of the brief. The cases are broken up by category below.
I.
Courts confronting a case with superseding cause and comparative fault, but the possible
superseding cause in the case could not be assigned comparative fault, either because it was immune
or was a non-party.
Lake v. Constr. Mach., Inc., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990); Brewer v. Teano, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Ct.
App. 1995) (but note that court uses a superseding cause analysis where the case could be decided on
no proximate cause grounds); Heritage Vill. Master Assoc., Inc. v. Heritage Vill. Water Co., 622 A.2d
578 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (but note that the superseding causes were inanimate "corrosive forces,"
and the court uses a superseding cause analysis to find that the possible superseding cause was not a
cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs' harm); Duphily v. De. Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821 (Del. 1995);
Gafford v. Duncan, 436 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (but note court uses a superseding cause
analysis where the case could be decided on no proximate cause grounds); Orthman v. Idaho Power
Co., 895 P.2d 561 (Idaho 1995) (but note state defines a superseding cause as an unforeseeable third
party, so defendant's assertion that plaintiff could be superseding cause cannot work for that reason);
Barkley v. Freeman, 827 P.2d 774 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (but note court uses a superseding cause
analysis where the case could be decided on no proximate cause grounds); Solimene v. Grauel & Co.,
507 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1987); O'Cain v. Freeman & Sons, Inc., 603 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1991); Foster
v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990) (comparative fault possible, but court finds one of two
defendants to have no duty to the plaintiff; court states that even if that defendant had a duty to the
plaintiff, the other defendant's acts would be a superseding cause of plaintiffs harm); Buck v. Union
Elec. Co., 887 S.W.2d 430 (Miss. Ct. App. 1994); Merrick v. Thomas, 522 N.W.2d 402 (Neb. 1994)
(potential superseding cause was dismissed from case after summary judgment); Doud v. Las Vegas
Hilton Corp., 864 P.2d 796 (Nev. 1993); Davis v. Brooks, 655 A.2d 927 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1993); Sarracino v. Martinez, 870 P.2d 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Shahzaman v. Green Bus Lines
Co., 625 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1995); Bruns v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 605 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1994); Lynch v. Norton Constr., Inc., 861
P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1993).
II. Cases in which comparative fault could be applied to the original actor and the superseding actor,
and in which the court also contemplated the latter could be a superseding cause.
LaVoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1992); Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Carlton,
892 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1995) (note that court uses superseding cause analysis to conclude that one act
is not a cause-in-fact ofplaintiffs harm); Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Assoc., Inc.,
866 P.2d 1342 (Ariz. 1994); Smith v. Johnson, 899 P.2d 199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Voight v. Colo.
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Mountain Club, 819 P.2d 1088 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm'rs
v. Salas, 511 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1987); Roseberry v. Brooks, 461 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(plaintiff could be assigned fault, but the court does not discuss this option; court finds plaintiff to be
a superseding cause of her own harm); Leary v. Poole, 705 P.2d 62 (Haw. CL App. 1985); Hagen v.
Texaco Ref. & Mktg., 526 N.W.2d 531 (Iowa 1995); Ames v. Dipietro-Kay Corp., 617 A.2d 559 (Me.
1992); Hafrier v. Iverson, 343 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 1984); Anderson v. Neb. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 538
N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1995) (comparative fault not considered; one of two possible superseding causes
is a non-party, the other is the plaintiff); Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H. 1986);
Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1995); Hicks v. Met. Ed. Co., 665 A.2d 529 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1995); Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, 542 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1988); Holmes v. Wegman Oil Co., 492
N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 1992); City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994); Venetoulias
v. O'Brien, 909 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App. 1995); Cramer v. Dept. of Hwys., 870 P.2d 999 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (note that one possible superseding cause is the plaintiff, the other is a non-party, and the
court does discuss including the non-party's fault in calculating damages); Wehnerv. Weinsten, 444
S.E.2d 27 (W.Va. 1994); Voight v. Reisterer, 523 N.W.2d 133 (Wis. CL App. 1994); McCorvery v.
Utah State Dept. of Transp., 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993).
1Il. Superseding cause and comparative fault in case, with some discussion of comparative fault's
impact on superseding cause.
Benner v. Bell, 602 N.E.2d 896, 901 (I1. App. Ct. 1992) (court considers whether comparative fault
should mean that "a remote cause can now appropriately be charged with some slight percentage of
liability," but concludes that this would undermine the foreseeability element of negligence; court
applies superseding cause analysis); Hooks v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514,520 (Ind. 1994) (plaintiff
argues either foreseeability of his actions under superseding cause analysis, or that Comparative Fault
eliminates that common law doctrine; court states that superseding cause has "long" been applied in
Indiana, and uses that analysis, but does not further address the question); NKC Hosps. v. Anthony,
849 S.W.2d 564, 569 (Ky. 1993) (superseding cause analysis and comparative fault applied; court
then says that "superseding causation, as such, is never submitted to the jury... except to the extent
that its elements are already incorporated in the comparative fault instructions as simply negligence;"
no further discussion of question); Sizemore v. Mont. Power Co., 803 P.2d 629 (Mont. 1990) (sole
proximate cause no longervalid after comparative fault adopted, but court seems to allow superseding
cause, and explains that proximate cause is still required part of a negligence analysis after
comparative fault's adoption); Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1994) (boy's
suicide was not a superseding cause relieving custodian of liability for his death, but note that boy's
comparative intentional fault could be considered; discussion focuses exclusively on comparing
intentional and negligent conduct in custodial suicide context-no general discussion oftopic); Minor
v. Zidell, 618 P.2d 392 (Okla. 1980) (court applies superseding cause analysis, considers comparative
fault's impact; court then states that comparative fault does not affect the cause-versus-condition
distinction in the proximate cause analysis because comparative fault affects breach, not causation;
in other words, the court does not squarely address the question).
IV. Case decided under contributory negligence regime.
Bourne v. Seventh Ward Gen. Hosp., 546 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant doctors'
negligent care was superseding cause ofplaintiff's death, despite plaintiff's earlierintentional suicide;
comparative fault could not be assigned under old regime).
V.

Neither superseding cause nor comparative fault apply.

Bath Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Wills, 847 P.2d 1141 (Colo. 1993); Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d
106 (Mich. 1992) (neither superseding cause nor comparative fault can apply where plaintiff had no
duty to protect himself under custodial suicide facts).
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argument elides the persuasive reasons for a diminished role for superseding cause
in the face of comparative concepts for apportioning liability. Many legal doctrines
can survive, in the fashion described by the Sofec Court, the adoption of a new and
related rule; last clear chance could "survive" the adoption of comparative
responsibility because the two are not intemally inconsistent nor mutually
repugnant.' 27 In short, when the rationale for an earlier doctrine is undercut by the
adoption of a new rule, modification or abolition of the earlier doctrine may well
be appropriate. And when a plaintiff s acts, however careless or unreasonable, are
denominated a superseding cause, thereby barring recovery, the basic principle of
comparative responsibility is substantially undermined.'28 Indeed, last clear
chance-a well-established rule during the time of contributory negligence-can
be understood as a rule reciprocal to superseding-cause cases like Sofec in which
the defendant's subsequent negligence is a superseding cause of harm.' 9 With last
clear chance, a defendant's subsequent negligence is deemed a superseding cause
of the harm, and plaintiffs contributory negligence, then, does not affect the
recovery. Last clear chance has been widely repudiated in comparative
responsibility jurisdictions.' 3 °
Sofec has been remarkably uninfluential in the six years since it was decided.
It has not been relied upon by any other court as a basis for a similar holding
outside of admiralty law. The lone state case in which it was cited occurred when
the court explained to the defendant that its claim that others had caused the harm,
not it, was not a superseding cause defense.' Despite the confusion and miasma
often created by proximate cause, I have some optimism that Sofec will not serve
as a serious detriment to recognition of comparative responsibility's impact on the
viability of superseding cause.

127. To be fair, the Court's addressing the issue in this manner may have been a result of
petitioners' framing the issue as whether superseding cause was "irreconcilable" and "inconsistent"
with the adoption of comparative responsibility in admiralty. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at
29, Sofec, (No. 95-129); Petitioners' Reply Brief on the Merits at 7-8, Sofec, (No. 95-129).
128. For additional criticism of Sofec, see FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.,
ADMIRALTY IN ANUTSHELL

156 (4th ed. 2001); David W. Robertson, EschewingErstatz Percentages:

A Simplified Vocabulary of Comparative Fault,45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 831, 841-42 (2001).
Prior to Sofec, several federal courts of appeals addressed the same issue, also under admiralty
law, with conflicting results. These cases are discussed in Christlieb, supranote 23, at 169-81.
129. See, e.g., Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1008 n.8 (Del. 1995) ("Indeed the trier of fact
may conclude that the evidence supporting the concept of last clear chance rises to the level of a
supervening cause of the injury."); Hunter v. Batton, 288 S.E.2d 244, 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding defendant's negligence is deemed the proximate cause of the harm when he has the last clear
chance to avoid causing injury and fails to do so); Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 478 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978) ("The claim oflast clear chance is in reality a claim that [defendants'] alleged negligence
constituted a superseding cause excusing [plaintiffs] prior negligence."). However, most
commentators view last clear chance as a rule whose purpose is to ameliorate the harsh effects of
contributory negligence.
130. See DOBBS, supra note 17, § 207, at 522.
131. See Butler v. Buchanan Marine, Inc., No. CV 9501493475, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1467, at *6-*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 22, 1998).
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And so it is as well when a third party, rather than the plaintiff, is the
intervening act of interest. Comparative contribution permits apportionment
between two defendants, each of whose tortious conduct was a factual cause of
plaintiff's harm. One difference between plaintiffs as superseding causes and other
defendants as superseding causes is that plaintiffs can always bear their comparative
share of liability. To do so they do not have to pay any money; they merely bear a
greaterportion ofthe harm without compensation. By contrast, among third parties,
there may be some who are unable to pay their full comparative share of the
plaintiffs damages, which creates the potential for inequitable apportionment
among defendants. However, modification ofjoint and several liability ameliorates
or eliminates the risk that a modestly culpable defendant will bear the entire loss,
even in those cases in which an egregiously culpable defendant is judgment
proof."' So long as the harm that occurs is one of the harms whose risks made a
defendant's conduct tortious-the core condition for proximate cause-the
existence of other actors whose tortious, even intentional or criminal, conduct
concurs to cause harm should not affect the liability vel non of the former.
Consider a product liability suit against the manufacturer of a fiber used in
carpeting. Plaintiff, who was burned in a fire in a hotel, claims that the fiber was
defective for use in carpeting because of its flammability. Ifthe plaintiff is correct,
the risk of harm making the fiber defective is that a fire will begin and spread,
causing bum damage. Should it matter whether the fire begins innocently, say by
lightning, negligently, say, by a guest discarding a match in a hallway, or through
criminal conduct, say by an arsonist igniting a fire in a guest room?
For superseding cause purposes, we should recognize initially that regardless
the
foreseeability of the source of ignition, the risk that made the product
of
defective is precisely what produced the harm. Unless one lards up the description
of the risk with details of the manner in which the harm occurs, contrary to wellsettled law,' 33 it should not be necessary to make the indeterminate inquiry about

132. Something equivalent to inequitable apportionment can occur when a modestly culpable
defendant is the sole tortfeasor and causes huge damages. There is substantial fortuity in tort law, and
some are unlucky. See ChristopherH. Schroeder, Causation,CompensationandMoralResponsibility,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 347, 360-61 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (discussing

the concept of fortuity of causation and what remedies are available for a transgression); Jeremy
Waldron, Moments of CarelessnessandMassive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTORTLAW
387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Michael Zimmerman, LuckandMoralResponsibility,91 ETHICS 374
(1987). That, of course, is why liability insurance is attractive. When there are multiple parties
involved, there exists the additional aspect of incomparable treatment among them, which increases
their concern.
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, cmt. c. illus. 2, § 435(1) (1965); 4 HARPER

ET AL., supranote 87, § 20.5, at 162-63 (noting that all authorities agree that the precise course of
events that occurred is not important for determining the scope of liability); DOBBS, supranote 17,
§ 189, at 466 (finding courts commonly state that a defendant remains subject to liability even if the
manner by which the harm occurred was unforeseeable); see also Larue v. Nat'l Union Elec. Corp.,
571 F.2d 51, 56-57 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that a dangerous opening in a fan enclosure of a canister
vacuum cleaner exposed defendant-manufacturer to liability even though a child inserted his penis
in the opening); Juisti v. HyattHotel Corp., 876 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Md. 1995) ("The manner in which
the risk culminates in harm may be unusual, improbable and highly unexpectable... and yet, if the

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 15
1132

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 1103

the foreseeability of the intervening act. The intervening act did not create the risk
that made the product defective. Here, the only role of the intervening act was the
entirely fortuitous, however unfortunate, provision of the source of ignition. That
source of ignition might have come from a variety of places, but so long as there
was sufficient risk of a source of ignition to make the fiber defective due to its
flammability, it is difficult to find a reason to134treat this case differently from a
similar one with a different source of ignition.

The best circumstances for eschewing any role for superseding cause in cases
involving intentional or criminal intervention is injurisdictions with several liability
that permit apportionment of liability among intentional and nonintentional
tortfeasors 1 35 In those circumstances, defendant's liability will be limited to its
comparative responsibility share of the harm,even if the arsonist is judgment proof.
In jurisdictions that do not permit apportionment between intentional and
nonintentional tortfeasors, the products liability defendant is subject to liability for
the entire damages, as would be the case ifjoint and several liability were retained.
Courts may be tempted to employ superseding cause to avoid what might appear
to be excessive liability. Yet, doing so leaves the entirety of the loss on the plaintiff,
and a defendant who should bear at least some liability for the loss without any
liability. This constitutes one of the reasons for permitting assignment of
36
comparative responsibility among intentional and nonintentional tortfeasors.1
One can imagine the defendant objecting as follows: "The foreseeable risks of
harm included accidental ignition of the rug, and I concede that I should be held
liable in that event. But, if the intentional act was unforeseeable, it increases the risk
of a fire in a way for which I should not be held liable." The difficulty with the
defendant's objection is that it confuses negligence or breach of duty with
proximate cause. The defendant was already determined to have sold a defective

harm suffered falls within the general danger area, there may be liability .. ")(quoting Moran v.
Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 19 (Md. 1975) (alteration in original)).
134. That was the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in d'Hedouville v. Pioneer
Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1977), in which it rejected the proposition that a criminal
act is always a superseding cause of injury. The court cast the issue as whether the arsonist's act was
foreseeable, relying on several Arizona cases in which the risk ofharm was a criminal act, rather than
on the situation before it, in which the facts were not such as to require the defendant to take
precautions specifically against the risk posed by foreseeable criminal conduct. Id. As the text
suggests, approaching cases such as this by asking whether the harm was one of the harms that the
defendant failed to take sufficient precautions to prevent (either under a negligence or strict products
liability standard) is, in my judgment, preferable. That the flexibility of the idea of foreseeability
permitted the d'Hedouville court to reach the same result should not distract attention from the
connection between the risks that made the defendant's conduct tortious and the harm that resulted,
regardless of the intervening causes that were necessary to bring about the harm. See also DOBBS,
supra note 17, § 190, at 473-74 (discussing similar cases).
135. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
136. Such an apportionment rule also requires a supplementary provision making a tortfeasor
who is negligent because of the failure to take adequate precautions against an intentional tortfeasor
liable both for the negligent tortfeasor's comparative responsibility and for the comparative

responsibility of the intentional tortfeasor as well. See
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

14 (2000).
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product because of the foreseeable risks of a fire. Yet the defendant may still avoid
liability if the other events necessary to cause a fire do not transpire. But that
outcome is a matter of luck for the defendant-sometimes defendants avoid liability
and sometimes they do not based on events over which they have no sway. That is
an inevitable consequence of tort law's insistence on factual causation. But that luck
is not a matter of right for the defendant who has already acted tortiously. So long
as the harm results from the same risks that made the defendant's conduct tortious,
there is nothing untoward in holding the unlucky defendant liable. 37
What about the employer who modifies an industrial machine or otherwise acts
negligently to cause, along with a third party, an employee's harm? In the past, two
opposing concerns affected courts in addressing whether the employer's conduct
was a superseding cause that prevented a product manufacturer from being held
liable. One such concern was that employers, because of the exclusive remedy
provision of workers' compensation, were immune from tort liability. Thus, tort
liability could not create incentives for employers to keep the workplace safe. This
was especially true of small employers that operated beneath the occupational
regulatory enforcement system and did not have loss-rated workers' compensation
insurance. A number of courts appreciated that product manufacturers could,
through products liability, be provided incentives to make their industrial machinery
and other products safer. This resulted in courts' giving short shrift to the role of an
employer in causing an accident and leaving product manufacturers with the
obligation to ensure greater safety such as it could. 3
The opposing tension was the unfairness of holding a manufacturer liable for
the entirety of an employee's injury when an employer's culpable or highly
culpable conduct also caused the injury. 39 That, of course, is precisely what
occurred with joint and several liability and the immunity from tort liability
provided the employer by workers' compensation. A number of courts responded

137. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Insurance, Deterrence and Liability, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICIONARY OF ECONOMICs AND THE LAw 335 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the

risks a tortfeasor takes and the growing trend of liability insurance); Basil A. Umari, Note, Is Tort Law
Indifferent to Moral Luck?, 78 TEX. L. REv. 467 (1999) (arguing that tort law has no interest in
eliminating the role of "moral luck" in imposing liability).
138. See generally Spurgeon v. Julius Blum, Inc. 816 F. Supp. 1317 (C.D. Ill. 1993); Anderson

v. Nissei ASB Mach. Co., 3 P.3d 1088 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Pust v. Union Supply Co., 561 P.2d 355
(Colo. Ct. App. 1976), affid, 583 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1978); Marois v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 539
A.2d 621 (Me. 1988); see also Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 285 (N.J. 1972) (reversing
lowercourtthat dismissed plaintiff's case against product manufacturer on the ground that customwas
for the employer to provide guards for punch press and therefore the manufacturer did not expect the
product to reach the employee without substantial change); Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp.,
739 P.2d 1177, 1184-88 (Wash. CL App. 1987) (reversing summary judgment for a defendantmanufacturer based on alterations made to its product after the plaintiff had begun to use it).
139. That unfairness was exacerbated by the subrogation lienprovided to employers that enabled
them to appropriate workers' compensation payments from any tort recovery by the plaintiff. Thus,
the product manufacturerreimbursed even thehighly culpable employerforits workers' compensation
payments.
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by employing superseding cause, or its1 4products
liability analog under the Second
0
Restatement, substantial modification.
The critical initial issue in these cases is whether the product was defective.
Typically, these cases involve an employer's modification of a product in a fashion
making it less safe, although other behavior, such as failure to maintain the product,
may be involved. Assessing defectiveness requires consideration of whether the
product manufacturer should have included additional safety equipment,
anticipating, for example, that a safety guard would be removed during the cleaning
of a machine and might not be reinstalled after the cleaning was completed. Must
the manufacturer design the machine with an interlock so that it cannot be operated
without the guard in place? We need not address the employer's modification as a
superseding cause if the product was not defective.
Defectiveness will depend on comparing the risks that canbe removed from the
product by the proposed alternative design with the benefits of the existing
design. 4 ' If that analysis leads to the conclusion that the benefits of the existing
design outweigh the risks it poses, the product is not defective, and any
consideration of superseding cause is unnecessary. But I suggest that if the
conclusion is otherwise about the defectiveness of the product, there similarly is no
need for superseding cause analysis, at least in those jurisdictions that have
modifiedjoint and several liability so that non-parties may be consideredby the jury
for apportionment of comparative responsibility.
Among jurisdictions that permit consideration of a nonparty's comparative
responsibility, the role of the employer can be taken into account by permitting the
fact-finder to consider the tortious conduct of the employer and to assign
comparative responsibility to it. Just as with settling parties whose comparative
responsibility is litigated surrogately by the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendants,
the plaintiff and the defendants have contrary interests and therefore have the
incentive to present evidence and to litigate the role of the employer in causing the
plaintiff's harm. 42 Thus, liability can be apportioned in these jurisdictions with a

140. See Porchia v. Design Equip. Co., 113 F.3d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1997); Hines v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 850 F.2d 1146,1151 (6th Cir. 1988); Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (D. Md.
1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1986); Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A.2d 38, 45 (Conn.

1997); Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 222 S.E.2d 105, 108-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Conder v. Hull
Lift Truck, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ind. 1982); St. Pierre v. Gabel, 351 So. 2d 821, 824 (La. Ct. App.

1977); Sikorski v. Link Elec. & Safety Control Co., 691 N.E.2d 749,754 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Davis
v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1997); Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnicshe GmbH, 955 S.W.2d
252, 257 (Tenn. 1997); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 594 P.2d 911, 913-15 (Wash. 1979) (en banc);

Glassey v. Continental Ins. Co., 500 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Wis. 1993).
141. I assume a risk-utility standard for design defectiveness. We could conduct a similar
analysis in a jurisdiction employing a consumer expectations standard.
142. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 627 So. 2d 367, 378 (Ala.
1993); Estate of Hunter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 729 So. 2d 1264, 1279-80 (1999); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 16 cmt. c (2000); Daniel Klerman, Settling
MultidefendantLawsuits: The Advantage of ConditionalSetoff Rules, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 448

(1996).
[C]ourts... do not find it difficult to determine whether the settling defendant
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device that permits a reasonably precise allocation of responsibility for the
plaintiff's harm. Of course, the responsibility assigned to the employer will
diminish the plaintiff s recovery. However, that consequence follows from the
implicitbargainimposedby workers' compensation-plaintiffis assured a recovery
for occupational injury regardless of the employer's negligence, but the recovery
is more modest than might be available in the tort system. Plaintiff should,
rightfully, bear any difference between the workers' compensation payments made
by her employer and the amount of tort liability that the employer would have borne
under the tort system. Comparative responsibility and modification of joint and
several liability permit determination of that amount for the first time.
While the elimination of superseding cause or substantial alteration in
occupational product injuries is attractive injurisdictions that permit apportionment
as I describe, I recognize that there are a significant number ofjurisdictions that do
not permit consideration of the comparative responsibility of the employer. That
leaves only the blunt, all-or-nothing apportionment device of superseding cause to
address the employer's role in determining liability for an industrial accident. I
would expect courts in such jurisdictions to continue to employ superseding cause,
but such use should not be mistaken as helpful in those jurisdictions that have more
refined tools available.
VI. CONCLUSION

The changes wrought with the advent of comparative responsibility are
considerably more extensive than one might have expected. But much of tort law
was crafted in a day when negligent plaintiffs were barred from recovery. That
rule's influence extended well beyond the obvious one of determining that a
negligent plaintiff-was barred from recovery. Once tort law recognized that liability
could be carved into finely gradated pieces, comparative contribution emerged.
Joint and several liability, fired in the oven of innocent plaintiffs, required
rethinking and modification when plaintiffs were no longer innocent. From these
adjustments, along with the evolution in the legal treatment of causation,
recognizing the dual aspects of legal cause and the appropriate role of proximate
cause, emerge persuasive reasons to consign superseding cause to the same
receptacle in which we have placed contributory negligence.

is liable. The litigating parties have the incentive and the ability to present the
relevant evidence and arguments ....If necessary, the settling defendant can be
deposed, subpoenaed, or called as a witness. The procedure to determine
whether the settling defendant is liable is very similar to the procedure to
determine his percentages [sic] of fault ......
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